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Fencing in the Frontier:
A Look into the Limits of Mail Fraud
Kristen Kate OrtW
"Federal prosecutors have long followed the maxim, when in doubt, charge
mail fraud."' The federal mail fraud statute,3 enacted in 1872, remains one
of the oldest federal criminal statutes in continuous use.4 Mail fraud has
been called the federal government's number-one weapon in the fight
against crime,' particularly because of its ease of applicability to new fac-
I J.D. expected 2007, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.B.A. 2004, Saint Mary's
College. The author would like to thank her family for their constant love and support.
2 Paul Mogin, Reiningin the Mail Fraud Statute, CHAMPION, at 12, 13 (May 2002) (quoting
John C. Coffee & Charles V. Whitehead, The Federalization of Fraud: Mail and Wire Fraud
Statutes, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 9.01 (0. Obermaier
& R. Morvillo eds., 199o)).
3 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (zooo).
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of,
loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure
for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security,
or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out
to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office
or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever
to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be
deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any
private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom,
any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or
such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which
it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any
such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution,
such person shall be fined not more than $i,ooo,ooo or imprisoned not
more than 30 years, or both.
Id.
4 Gregory H. Williams, Good Government by Prosecutorial Decree: The Use andAbuse of Mail
Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137 (1990).
5 Id. ("U.S. Attorneys marvel at its ability to cover a wide range of criminal activity.");
see also 2 SARAH N. WELLING ET. AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED ACTIONS: CRIMES,
FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RICO 3 (1998) ("To federal prosecutors of white
collar crime, the mail fraud statute is ... our true love. We may flirt with RICO, show off with
iob-5, and call the conspiracy law 'darling,' but we always come home to the virtues of 18
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tual situations. 6 The purpose of the mail fraud statute is to prevent the post
office from being used to carry out fraudulent schemes.7 Over the years,
the statute has captured a variety of schemes including consumer frauds,
stock frauds, land frauds, insurance frauds, commodity frauds, blackmail,
counterfeiting, election fraud, and bribery.8 Mail fraud not only can be a
broad tool for the government on its own, but is also an underlying tool for
the government to pursue other crimes, such as racketeering.
The Supreme Court envisioned a protective role for the statute, so the
Court severed the statute from common-law fraud, holding that mail fraud
reaches fraudulent representations pertaining to the past, present, and fu-
ture. 9 Prosecutors have utilized that protective role to their advantage in
capturing newly created frauds not yet recognized by the legislature. Al-
though the statute captures a wide range of crimes, its malleability affords
prosecutors too much discretion in determining what conduct violates the
law, a role that should be left to the legislature. To curtail the reach of the
mail fraud statute, federal courts have applied judicial limits to each of the
elements of the crime. This Note examines the constraints placed on the
statute by both the Supreme Court and several circuit courts of appeals.
Part I illustrates the strength of mail fraud.' 0 Part II focuses on the expan-
sive reach of each of the elements of mail fraud and the limits applied to
each of the three elements." Part III explains the relief provided under
the sentencing guidelines for those convicted of mail fraud."l Finally, Part
IV addresses the need for the Supreme Court to provide further guidance
U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity."); Ellen S. Podgor,
Mail Fraud: Redefining the Boundaries, io ST. THoMAs L. REv. 557, 558 (1998) ("[Mlail fraud
[is] a prosecutor's 'Stradivarius' or 'Colt 45."' (quoting Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud
Statute (Part 1), I8 Duo. L. REv. 771 (198o))); Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering
Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 954
(993) ("[Vlarious federal fraud statutes-in particular, the mail and wire fraud statutes," that
"[wlith regard to the statutory weapons available to prosecutors, they rank by analogy with
hydrogen bombs on stealth aircraft.").
6 Elkan Abramowitz, 'Intent to Harm' in Federal Statute on Mail Fraud, N.YL.J., at 3 (May
5, 1998).
7 Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896); see Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should
Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435,
442 (1995) ("The House sponsor of the legislation stated that the provision was designed
,to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities ... by thieves, forgers,
and rapscallions generally, for the purposes of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people
of the country."' (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3 d Sess. 35 (1870) (statement of Rep.
Farnsworth))).
8 Ryan Y. Blumel, Mail and Wire Fraud, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 677, 678 (2005).
9 See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
io See infra notes 14-35 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 36-155 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 156-68 and accompanying text.
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to lower courts in restraining the mail fraud statute.13 The Court has lim-
ited the statute in the past and should continue down that path by adopting
limits in the area of the honest services doctrine.
I. THE EASE OF CHARGING MAIL FRAUD
In 1896, Durlandv. United States4 gave the Supreme Court its first oppor-
tunity to interpret the mail fraud statute. John Durland schemed to de-
fraud bond investors by taking money on bonds he knew would not ma-
ture. Durland argued the mail fraud statute did not reach such conduct
because at common law the definition of false pretenses meant there must
be "misrepresentation as to some existing fact and not a mere promise as
to the future."' 5 Refusing to read the statute so narrowly, the Court inter-
preted "any scheme or artifice to defraud" to include "everything designed
to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and
promises as to the future." 6 Durland "cut the mail fraud statute loose from
its common law moorings" and set forth a broad vision of the protective
function of the Act. 7 To allow the statute to serve such a protective role,
the federal courts have afforded the mail fraud act a broad and flexible
reading," turning the statute into a "generic fraud statute. ' ' 9
Using its constitutional power to establish post offices,20 Congress origi-
nally enacted section 1341 to protect the establishment of the United States
Post Office. Over the years, the mailing element of the statute has dissi-
pated in importance, becoming a simple jurisdictional hook the prosecutor
must prove.2" With any federal prosecution, the government must establish
federal jurisdiction, and "virtually any mailing in the course of a scheme to
defraud may now trigger federal prosecution for mail fraud."22 The ease
in proving the jurisdictional element prompts prosecutors to charge mail
fraud rather than other crimes. For example, mail fraud captures bribery
of a public official because taking the bribe defrauds the public of the right
to the official's honest services. The prosecutor could charge a public of-
ficial under the Hobbs Act 3 for bribery, but then the prosecutor would
13 See infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
14 Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
15  Id. at 312.
16 ld. at 313.
17 2 WELLING, supra note 5, at 6.
18 Id.
19 Ellen S. Podgor, CriminalFraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 752 (1999).
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
21 See infra notes 127-49 and accompanying text.
22 Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in CriminalLaw, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. I 127,
11592 (997).23 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
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have to prove federal jurisdiction through either the defendant's effect on
commerce in the individual case or movement of an article through com-
merce.
2 4
Because of the simplicity of proof required in establishing mail fraud,
the Act "is the government's most commonly used predicate act" to a charge
of racketeering.2 5 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1962, "it is unlawful for any person"
to receive income "from a pattern of racketeering."2 16 Racketeering activity
includes any act that is indictable under mail fraud 7 and a pattern of rack-
eteering activity requires just two acts of racketeering activity.2" These two
acts can easily be reached when the predicate act is mail fraud because each
mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under
section 1341, and therefore each separate act of mail fraud is an act of rack-
eteering. 9 Ellen Podgor, a law professor who studies mail fraud, described
the benefit of the elasticity of the mail fraud statute in combination with
RICO and tax offenses:
Unlike mail fraud, tax offenses are not included as predicate acts for a RICO
charge. Therefore, by calling the fraudulently filed returns mail fraud as op-
posed to tax fraud, the prosecution accomplishes penalty enhancement for
an offense that Congress never even considered during the enactment of
the statutory crimes of mail fraud or RICO.30
The breadth of mail fraud also allows prosecutors and courts to fill gaps
in the current criminal law and capture undefined crimes.3 "When a 'new'
fraud develops, the mail fraud statute becomes a stopgap device" to pros-
ecute the new fraud until new legislation can be passed to deal directly
with the fraud.32 While such adaptability allows prosecutors to go after new
forms of fraud, it should be legislatures and not courts defining criminal
24 Id. ("[wihoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce")
25 Ellen S. Podgor, MailFraud: Opening Leters, 43 S.C. L. REV. 223, 263-64 (1992).
26 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2ooo).
27 Id. § 196I(I)(B).
z8 Id. § 1961(5).
29 United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F2d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1978).
30 Podgor, supra note 25, at z66.
31 Todd E. Molz, Comment, The Mail Fraud Statute: An ArgumentforRepealby Implication,
64 U. CHI. L. REv. 983, 985 (1997) ("Such gapfilling is good when the illicit activity is a new
form of fraud that Congress has yet to consider. For example, before Congress passed the
credit card fraud statute, prosecutors and courts used the mail fraud statute to prosecute such
fraud.").
32 United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, J., dissenting); see also
Molz, supra note 31, at 985 ("To define the limits of mail fraud, however, would destroy the
statute's ability to adapt and thereby capture new forms of fraud.").
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activity.33 While the statute serves as a catchall devise which covers crimes
not yet recognized by the legislature, this strength affords prosecutors too
much discretion and fails to give adequate notice of what type of conduct
the statute covers. 34 Further, prosecutors use the mail fraud statute despite
the existence of particularized legislation, thus using the statute as a "bad"
gapfiller and undermining congressional intent.3" As a result, courts have
begun to focus on the abuse of the mail fraud statute.
II. JUDICIAL LIMITS
The courts have attempted to reduce the infinite reach of the mail fraud
statute through judicial limits. To convict a defendant of mail fraud, the
government must show that the defendant (1) formed a scheme to defraud
(2) with the intent to defraud (3) while using the United States Postal
Service or a private interstate commercial carrier in furtherance of that
scheme.36 The "scheme ... to defraud"37 does not have to be successful, 38
and includes schemes to deprive someone of both property39 and honest
33 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
34 Gregory D. Jones, Note, Prinmum Non Nocere: The Expanding "Honest Services" Mail
Fraud Statute and the Physician-Patient Fiduciary Relationship, 51 VAND. L. REV. 139, 146 n.26
(1998).
35 See Podgor, supra note 5; see also Molz, supra note 31. One court recognized this
problem and held that mail fraud was preempted by a more specific tax fraud statute. Id. at
991.
36 I8 U.S.C. § 1341 (2ooo); see United States v. Akpan, 407 F3d 360, 370 (5th Cir. 2005)
("To prove a mail fraud violation under § 1341, the government must establish: (s) a scheme
to defraud; (2) use of the mails to execute the scheme; and (3) the specific intent to defraud.
Each separate use of the mails to further a scheme to defraud is a separate offense." (citations
omitted)); United States v. Holmes, 406 F3d 337,353-54 (5th Cir. 2005) ("To prove mail fraud
under § 1341, the government must show (i) a scheme to defraud; (2) the use of the mails to
execute the scheme; and (3) the specific intent to defraud. In addition, the Supreme Court
has interpreted § 1341 to require that the misstatement made in the course of the scheme
to defraud be a material one." (citations omitted)); Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F3d
616, 620 (9th Cir. 2004) ("To allege a violation of mail fraud under § 1341, it is necessary
to show that (i) the defendants formed a scheme or artifice to defraud; (z) the defendants
used the United States mails or caused a use of the United States mails in furtherance of the
scheme; and (3) the defendants did so with the specific intent to deceive or defraud" (citations
omitted)); Fountain v. United States, 357 F.3d 250, 255 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The essential elements
of a mail fraud violation are (i) a scheme to defraud, (2) money or property [as the object of the
scheme], and (3) use of the mails to further the scheme" (citations omitted)); United States v.
Sawyer, 85 E 3 d 713, 723 (ist Cir. 1996) ("To prove mail and wire fraud, the government must
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt: (i) the defendant's knowing and willing participation in a
scheme or artifice to defraud with the specific intent to defraud, and (2) the use of the mails
or interstate wire communications in furtherance of the scheme.").
37 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
38 See Durland v. United States, I61 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1896).
39 Id. § 1341 ("obtaining money or property").
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services.4 ° The Supreme Court and the circuit courts have applied limits to
each of these elements, with deprivation of honest services remaining the
largest area courts have attempted to restrict.
A. Scheme to Defraud
1. Deprivation of Honest Services.-The doctrine of the deprivation of hon-
est and faithful service developed to fit the situation in which a public of-
ficial avails himself of his public position to enhance his private advantage
and thus deprive his constituents of their right to have him perform his
duties in their best interest.4' For instance, when the official decides how
to vote on an issue, his constituents have a right to have their best interests
form the basis of that decision, but if the official instead secretly makes
the decision based on his own personal interest (when he takes a bribe or
benefits from a conflict of interest), "the official has defrauded the public
of his honest services. ' ' 4 The honest services doctrine has been applied
to government officials who defraud the public of the official's honest ser-
vices, elected officials and campaign workers who falsify votes and thereby
defraud the electorate of the right to an honest election,43 "and private per-
sons who abuse fiduciary duties by taking bribes."'
In McNally v. United States,45 the Supreme Court ended (for a very brief
period of time) mail fraud actions under the honest services doctrine.
Rather than interpreting the mail fraud statute in a manner that left its
outer boundaries ambiguous, the Supreme Court held that the statute pro-
tects only property rights and not the right to honest services.46 McNally
appears to have been decided largely on the basis of separation of powers
considerations: "[clourts are not free to expand criminal liability for fraud
40 j8 U.S.C. § 1346 (zooo) ("the term "scheme or artifice to defraud" includes a scheme
or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services").
41 See United States v. Frost, 125 F3d 346, 365 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lopez-
Lukis, 102 F3d 1164, 1169 ( Ith Cir. 1997).
42 Lopez-Lukis, IO E3d at i169.
43 The Sixth Circuit has recently interpreted the honest services definition more
narrowly, finding "the plain terms of [§ 1346], the Supreme Court's discussion of the statute
in Cleveland and the legislative history of the statute all demonstrate that Congressional
enactment of §1346 did not revive those cases involving prosecutions under the mail fraud
statute for deprivations of the intangible right of honest elections." United States v. Turner,
465 F3d 667,674 (6th Cir. 2oo6). Instead, the right to honest elections is separate and distinct
from the right to honest services. Id. at 673.
44 United States v. Rybicki, 354 F3d 124, 133 (zd Cir. 2003).
45 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350(1987).
46 Id. at 36o ("Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries
ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good
government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope to the protection of
property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has.").
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beyond the clear statement of Congress."4 7 The Court stated that if Con-
gress wanted to extend mail fraud to deprivation of honest services, it had
to speak more clearly.48 Congress took less than a year to respond to the
Supreme Court's invitation. Congress overturned the Court's elimination
of the honest services doctrine by passing 18 U.S.C. § 134641 with the in-
tention of reinstating all the pre-McNally case law pertaining to the mail
fraud statute without change.5" This allowed the continued expansion of
the vague right to honest services, particularly because the statute failed to
define what the right to honest services includes.51
Although failure to define honest services has created plausible argu-
ments that section 1346 is unconstitutionally vague, courts have failed to
invalidate section 1346 for its lack of definition. A statute may be vague if it
fails to provide notice that would enable ordinary individuals to understand
the conduct that is prohibited or if it authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." Prior to McNally, there were numerous prosecutions of de-
privation of honest services. Courts find these cases describe the "criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited," so courts do not believe the potential reach of
section 1346 is virtually limitless as to encourage arbitrary enforcement. 3
Nevertheless, the limitless expansion of the mail fraud statute opens the
door for abuse through "selective prosecution and the degree of raw politi-
cal power the freeswinging club of mail fraud affords federal prosecutors."54
Prosecutors may have careerist motives to stalk the "big kill," "typically a
highly visible business or political figure, even if the evidence ultimately
obtained shows misconduct that is relatively modest in proportion to other
violations by less notable persons."5 5 Although courts are not willing to
strike down the statute completely due to vagueness, they do confine the
statute through judicially applied limits.
By adding an extra element of a violation of state law, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals took a major step towards limiting the honest services
doctrine. In United States v. Brumley, the court held that in addition to prov-
ing a scheme to defraud and use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme,
the government must also show that the honest services are owed under
47 Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 134.
48 McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.
49 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
50 134 CONG. REc. SI7, 36o-o2 (daily ed. Nov. IO, 1988).
51 See Henning, supra note 7, at 464-66.
52 Rybicki, 354 U.S. at 134.
53 Id. at 142.
54 United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d io8, 143 (2d. Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., dissenting).
55 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the "Evolution"
of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 21 (1983).
2oo6-2oo7]
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an existing state law and that they were in fact not provided. 6 Reliance
on state law prevents the federal government from imposing upon states a
federal vision of appropriate services owed to others when such rights and
duties can be located under state law. 7 Alleging that services were not
done honestly does not allege a violation of mail fraud "if the official does
all that is required under state law." 8 The court feared to hold otherwise
would bring "almost any illegal act within the province of the mail fraud
statute."
5 9
Brumley placed boundaries on the federal government's ability to define
good government, but the opinion was not without criticism. The dissent-
ing judges took issue with the court assuming "a role somewhere between
a philosopher king and a legislator to create its own definitions of the terms
of a criminal statute."'  While Brumley may stretch beyond a judicial opin-
ion, the court's new requirement was a step in the right direction towards
limiting an ever-expanding statute. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals en-
dorsed the Fifth Circuit's stringent interpretation of section 1346 and now
also requires "a state law limiting principle for honest services fraud.
61
The First Circuit Court of Appeals requires a clear violation of federal
law by state government employees,6 as opposed to state law as discussed
above. The court found the need for some limit because "[tlo allow every
[wrongdoing] of state governmental obligations to amount to mail fraud
would effectively turn every [wrongdoing] into a federal felony."63 The
opinion made clear that a mere violation of a state ethics law does not "suf-
fice to establish the intent to deprive the citizenry of the 'honest services'
of a government official," and thus the violation cannot establish a violation
of the mail fraud statute.' 4 The court requires more to support a mail fraud
56 United States v. Brumley, 116 E3 d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1997). ButseeJohn C. Coffee, Jr.,
Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Pub/ic/Private Distinction, 35 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 427,
446-47 (1998) (Brumley leaves open the question of whether section 1346 requires a criminal
offense under the relevant state law (as was the case in Brumley), or merely a violation of state
common law norms); Daniel W Hurson, Comment, MailFraud, The Intangible Rights Doctrine,
and the Infusion of State Law: A Bermuda Triangle of Soils, 38 Hous. L. REV. 297, 320 (2oo0)
("[W]ithin the Fifth Circuit, there may no longer be uniformity in federal mail fraud law.
Indeed, one could enter Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi all on a given day and, depending
on the duties owed according to the laws of each state, engage in activity that could be subject
to mail fraud prosecution in one state while being insulated from prosecution in a neighboring
state.").
57 Brumley, 116 F3d at 734.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 736 (Jolly & DeMoss, JJ., dissenting).
61 United States v. Murphy, 323 F3d 102, 16 (3d Cir. 2003).
62 See United States v. Sawyer, 85 F3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996).
63 Id. at 728.
64 United States v. Goldberg, 928 F Supp. 89,94 (D. Mass. 1996).
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conviction under section 1346, such as proof of the defendant's fraudulent
intent 6 or the defendant's contemplation of some actual harm or injury.66
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took a different approach in in-
terpreting section 1346. In McNally, the Supreme Court stated "a public of-
ficial owes a fiduciary duty to the public, and misuse of his office for private
gain is a fraud. ' 67 The Seventh Circuit has held that through the enactment
of section 1346, Congress intended to reinstate the McNally definition.'
Thus, a public employee's misuse of his position for private gain is an es-
sential element of an honest services prosecution. 69 Criminal fraud does
not exist merely because the public official breaches his fiduciary duty.70
Application of the honest services doctrine in the private sector is trou-
bling to courts.7 In the public sector, "citizens elect a public official to
act for the common good," and when the office is corrupted by bribes and
kickbacks, "the essence of the political contract is violated."7 " But enforce-
ment of the intangible right to honest services in the private sector has
weaker justification since relationships in the private sector often rest on
economic expectations rather than the abstract satisfaction of receiving a
person's honest services for their own sake.7 3 Courts are reluctant to deem
every breach of contract or every misstatement made in the course of deal-
ing a deprivation of the right to honest services.74 The Seventh Circuit,
in United States v. Walters,7" illustrates the extremes that the honest servic-
es doctrine could reach in the private sector. The court, in questioning
whether a practical joke would violate section 1341, posed the following
scenario to a prosecutor:
A mails B an invitation to a surprise party for their mutual friend C. B drives
his car to the place named in the invitation. But there is no party; the ad-
dress is a vacant lot; B is the butt of a joke. The invitation came by post; the
cost of the gasoline means that B is out of pocket.16
65 Sawyer; 85 E3d at 725.
66 Id.
67 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 355 (1987).
68 United States v. Bloom, 149 F3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 654; seealso United States v. Jain, 93 E3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996) ("(Elvery case
of breach of public trust and misfeasance in office in connection with which some mailing has
occurred does not and cannot fall within the confines of the mail fraud statute.").
71 See United States v. Frost, 125 F3d 346, 358 (6th 1997) ("[Aipplication of the 'right
to honest services' doctrine to the private sector is problematic").
72 Jain, 93 F.3d at 441.
73 Frost, 12 5 E3d at 365.
74 United States v. Cochran, io9 E3d 66o, 667 (ioth Cir. 1997).
75 United States v. Waiters, 997 E2d i 219 (7th Cir. 1993).
76 Id. at 1224.
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The prosecutor responded that this scenario would be a violation under the
federal mail fraud statute, but assured the court that "his office pledge[d] to
use prosecutorial discretion wisely."" Although practical jokes do not rou-
tinely come to the attention of prosecutors, discretion to prosecute under
a serious federal criminal statute for such a minor infraction indicates the
broad nature of section 1341 when coupled with section 1346.78
The lower courts have created a variety of ways to limit the honest ser-
vices doctrine in the private sector. In order to avoid the over-criminaliza-
tion of private relationships, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals requires a
breach of a fiduciary duty owed under federal law.79 The private individual
commits mail fraud by breaching his fiduciary duty and thereby depriving
another person or entity of the duty of honest services owed by that indi-
vidual.8 0 Not only must the prosecution prove there was such a breach of a
fiduciary duty, the government must also prove that "the defendant intend-
ed to breach his fiduciary duty and [should have reasonably] foreseen that
the breach would create an identifiable economic risk to the victim."' ' s
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that section 1346 pro-
hibits a scheme to use the mails to enable an employee of a private entity
purporting to act for and in the interests of his employer secretly to act in
his own interests instead."2 Typically, private-sector honest services cases
fall either under the category of cases involving bribes and kickbacks or un-
der the category of cases involving self-dealing.83 In cases involving bribes
or kickbacks, "the undisclosed [bribe] is sufficient to make out the crime."'
However, in self-dealing cases, "the existence of a conflict of interest alone
is not sufficient to do so," and there is an additional requirement that the
self-dealing conduct cause, or be capable of causing, some detriment to the
employer.8 5 There must also be proof of a duty owed by the employee, but
the Second Circuit failed to decide whether the source of the duty owed is
defined by state or federal law.
Without a definition of honest services, "the potential reach of § 1346 is
virtually limitless. '8 6 Lower courts have been left to interpret section 1346
and apply their own limits, but they are forced to make it up as they go
77 Id.
78 Jason T Elder, Comment, Federal Mail Fraud Unleashed- Revisiting the Ciminal Catch-
All, 77 OR. L. REv. 707, 728-29 (1998).
79 See United States v. Frost, 125 E3d 346,358 (6th 1997).
8o Id. at 366.
81 Id. at 369.
82 United States v. Rybicki, 354 F3d 124 (2nd Cir. 2002).
83 Id. at 139.
84 Id. at 141.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 135.
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along.87 And although there are inconsistent limits among the circuits, lack
of conformity is better than no limits at all.
2. Deprivation of Propery.-Mail fraud includes schemes to defraud a per-
son of money or property,88 but a conviction for mail fraud does not require
that the defendant obtain the money or property.8 9 Not only does mail
fraud encompass deprivation of tangible property, it also captures intan-
gible property. In Carpenterv. United States, a Wall Street Journal investment
advice columnist divulged information from his column to brokers before
publication.' The brokers made large profits by trading on this advanced
information and shared those profits with the columnist. The Supreme
Court in Carpenter held that confidential business information is a property
right.9' Although the Court ultimately recognized this intangible property
right, sprinkled throughout the opinion are additional justifications for rec-
ognizing such a right. The Court pointed out that the columnist was aware
of the Journal's confidentiality policy.9 Additionally, the Court mentioned
the fiduciary duty an employee owes to protect confidential information
obtained during the course of employment.93 In the same year as Car-
penter, the Court had refused to recognize the intangible right to honest
services in McNally." Providing extra reasons in Carpenter seems to indi-
cate the Court's hesitancy in extending property rights to the outer limit,
so by defending the holding by mentioning fiduciary duties and company
87 Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the New
York Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-
Appellants-Cross-Appellees, United States v. Rybicki, 354 F3d 124 (2nd Cir. 2002) (No. oo-
1043(L)), 2002 WL 33770689,
88 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (zooo).
89 Porcelli v. United States, 404 F3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. zoo5).
90 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 23 (1987).
91 Id. at 26 ("The Journal had a property right in keeping confidential and making
exclusive use, prior to publication, of the schedule and contents of the "Heard" column.");
see, e.g., United States v. Hedaithy, 392 E3d 580, 594 (3d. Cir. 2004) (educational testing
company had "property interest," cognizable under mail fraud statute, in keeping confidential
and making exclusive use of confidential business information contained in standardized test
that was administered to foreign students to measure their English proficiency, which was
recognized as yardstick by colleges in their admissions process for foreign students).
92 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23, 28. The columnist was familiar that the Journal's business
information which it intended to keep confidential was its property and declaration to that
effect was in the employee manual.
93 Id. at 27 ("[Allthough a decision grounded in the provisions of a written trust agreement
prohibiting the unapproved use of confidential Government information, we noted the similar
prohibitions of the common law, that even in the absence of a written contract, an employee
has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential information obtained during the course of his
employment.").
94 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 0987).
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policy, the Court could feel more at ease in recognizing intangible property
rights.
In limiting the reach of mail fraud, the Seventh Circuit clarified "de-
privation of property" in United States v. Walters.95 Walters involved an in-
dictment of an agent who signed agency contracts with college athletes
still playing for their colleges. The government argued the defendant de-
prived the university of money because the university contributed scholar-
ship funds to these athletes who had become ineligible as a result of the
agency contracts.' In actuality, however, it was the players who deprived
the university of the funds and not the agent. The court held that only a
scheme to obtain money or other property from the victim by fraud violates
section 1341, emphasizing that "[l]osses that occur as byproducts of a de-
ceitful scheme do not satisfy the statutory requirement."97 The agent did
not deprive the college of scholarship funds when he had no connection
with the college.
The Supreme Court weighed in on the definition of property after Car-
penter. Following Congress's quick reaction to McNally by creating legisla-
tion expanding the definition of mail fraud to include honest services,
98
"the Court largely left § 1341 alone for the next decade." 99 In 2000, the
Court in Cleveland v. United States held that permits and licenses do not
qualify as property under section 1341.'1 The Supreme Court narrowed
the scope of the statute and clarified that the object of the fraud must be
property in the hands of the victim.'0 l The Court addressed the ambiguity
of the word property and declared that the ambiguity in a criminal statute
should be resolved in favor of lenity.102
Because the Supreme Court issued a blow in Cleveland to the defini-
tion of property, the issue of what constituted property took center stage
in subsequent court opinions interpreting the case. Yet it seems the courts
missed another major statement contained within the Cleveland opinion.
The Supreme Court looked back at its interpretation of the mail fraud stat-
ute in McNally. Focusing on the beginning of section 1346, which reads
"[wihoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises,"'0 3 the Supreme Court reiterated
95 United States v. Walters, 997 Ed 1219 (7th Cir. 1993).
96 Id. at 1221.
97 Id. at 1227.
98 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
99 Mogin, supra note z, at 13.
ioo Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15 (zooo).
ioi See id. at 2o ("Whatever interest Louisiana might be said to have in its video poker
licenses, the State's core concern is regulatory.").
102 Id. at 25.
103 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
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its past holding by rejecting the idea that the two phrases in the statute
identifying the scheme could be read independently. The second phrase
of the statute merely modifies the first rather than creating a separate of-
fense, and "any benefit the government derives from the statute must be
limited to the Government's interests as a property holder" 104
As already discussed, McNally rejected the honest services doctrine and
rested on the concern of an ever-expanding mail fraud statute in the area of
honest services. Congress quickly overturned this opinion, so courts have
ignored the case. However, McNally stood for more than just a rejection of
the honest services doctrine, and Cleveland has revived the sentiments ar-
ticulated in McNally. Reading the two cases together, this Note concludes
that the government must prove either a scheme to defraud someone of
honest services or a scheme to defraud someone of money or property; a
scheme just to defraud with no objective will not be prosecutable. Mail
fraud, according to the Supreme Court, is limited in scope to protection of
property rights and honest services.
As mentioned, many courts seem to have missed this interpretation.
For example, although decided after Cleveland, United States v. Chandler in-
terpreted the mail fraud statute to include crimes "to [devise a scheme to
defraud] or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises." 105 The Eleventh Circuit viewed
the statute's phrasing in the disjunctive, construing the statute as prohibit-
ing two separate unlawful acts and therefore allowing two independent
grounds for prosecution."0 6 Conversely, the Second Circuit seems to have
picked up on the Supreme Court's ruling. The Second Circuit requires the
prosecution to prove "a scheme to defraud money or property as the object
of the scheme."'107 It seems the rest of the circuit courts fail to construe the
"money or property" requirement as a limitation on the types of schemes
that are prosecutable under the statute. 10 8 But even if courts do recognize
this distinction, courts will likely construe the definition of property liber-
ally to capture wide varieties of fraud.
3. Materiality.-The Supreme Court further defined "scheme to defraud"
in Nederv. United States, holding that materiality of falsehood is an element
of the federal mail fraud statute." 9 The Court ruled that Congress intend-
ed to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms, and
the Court was unwilling to infer that in the absence of an express reference
to materiality in the statute that Congress intended to drop that element
104 Cleveland, 531 U.S. at z6.
105 United States v. Chandler, 388 E3d 796, 804 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
io6 Id.
107 Fountain v. United States, 357 E3d 250, 255 (2d Cir. 2004).
io8 Id.
1o9 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999).
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from the fraud statutes."' Materiality limits the extent to which conduct
may be prosecuted.
B. With the Intent to Defraud
One must possess the specific intent to deceive or defraud in order to com-
mit mail fraud."' Some courts, however, have ignored this requirement by
holding the statute reaches material misrepresentations made with a reck-
less disregard for the truth."' Because of the difficulty in directly proving
the defendant's state of mind, the element is usually inferred from a variety
of circumstantial evidence." 3 Intent may be inferred from evidence that
the defendant attempted to conceal activity, from evidence of the defen-
dant's misrepresentations, from the defendant's knowledge of a false state-
ment, or from conversion of property by the defendant to his own use."4
Since the statute focuses on criminalizing the use of mail in furtherance
of a scheme to defraud, there is no requirement that the scheme succeed.
This means the prosecution bears no burden in proving loss to a victim
or gain by the defendant."' However, fraudulent intent may be inferred
where actual harm exists as a natural and probable result of a scheme.'' 6
Regardless of how fraud is shown, the fact remains the government
must prove intent existed. In the absence of actual or potential harm from
the scheme, the government must present evidence independent of the
scheme to show fraudulent intent toward the victims."7 In other words,
the government must show that the schemer contemplated some actual
harm or injury."' "By holding the government to a strict standard of proof
on the mens rea element of the crime of mail fraud, courts have limited
IIo Id. at 23.
I I I United States v. Frost, 125 F3d 346, 358 (6th Cit. 1997). However, the government
does not need to prove that the defendant had intent to break the law. See United States v.
Wicker, 8o E3d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1996).
112 United States v. Coyle, 63 E3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cit. 1995) ("Proof of specific intent
is required, which may be found from a material misstatement of fact made with reckless
disregard for the truth.").
113 See United States v. Smith, 133 F3 d 737, 743 (ioth Cir. 1997).
114 See United States v. Prows, 118 F3d 686, 692 (Ioth Cir. 1997); United States v.
Sokolow, 91 F3 d 396, 407 (3d Cir. 1996).
115 WELLING, supra note 5, at 16.
116 United States v. Cochran, io9 F3d 660, 668 (ioth Cit. 1997).
117 Id.
I i8 United States v. Jain, 93 E3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Essential to a scheme to
defraud is fraudulent intent .... The scheme to defraud need not have been successful or
complete. Therefore, the victims of the scheme need not have been injured. However, the
government must show that some actual harm or injury was contemplated by the schemer"
(quoting United States v. D'Amato, 39 F 3 d 1249, 1257 (2d Cit. 1994))); D'Amato, 39 F3 d at
1257.
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the application of the statute.""' 9 United States v. Jain,120 a case decided by
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, illustrates how the requirement of
intent narrows the scope of mail fraud. The government presented strong
evidence of a patient referral kickback scheme; however, there was no evi-
dence of tangible harm to any of the doctor's patients.'' Since no actual
harm occurred to the patients, the government needed to "produce evi-
dence independent of the alleged scheme to show the defendant's fraudu-
lent intent."' 2 No such evidence existed because Dr. Jain provided his
patients with the highest quality psychological services. 3 Failure to show
intent allowed Jain to avoid liability for mail fraud.
A defendant may also avoid liability through the defense of good faith.
Good faith constitutes a complete defense to a charge of mail fraud since
there is an absence of intent.2 4 A person cannot have the requisite intent
to defraud if he believes the information provided in the mailing is true.2 5
If John Durland, the defendant in the Supreme Court's first case interpret-
ing mail fraud, had entered in good faith upon his business and believed
that it could make enough to justify the promised returns on the bonds,
then his conviction could not have been sustained.2 6 This defense poten-
tially limits the zealous prosecutor from pursuing absurd cases.
C. Using the Mail in Furtherance of the Scheme to Defraud
When enacted in 1872, the statute was designed to protect the United
States Post Office from being used to carry out fraudulent schemes.2 7 Mail
fraud does not reach all frauds, but only those limited instances in which
the use of the mails is part of the execution of the fraud." 8 But now the
breadth of the mailing element has reduced the element to nothing but a
jurisdictional hook, and the statute has become a generic fraud statute.
119 Podgor, supra note 5, at 586.
i2o Jain, 93 E 3 d at 436.
121 Id. at 439.
122 Id. at44z (quoting D'Amato, 39 F3 d at 1257).
123 Id.
124 United States v. Dunn, 961 F2d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 1992).
125 United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541, 549-50 (2d Cir. i991).
126 Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1896).
127 See id. at 313;seealso Moohr, supra note 22, at 1150.
128 United States v. Frost, 125 F3d 346, 358 (6th Cir. 1997);see 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000)
("[Flor the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any
post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or
receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or
such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be
delivered by the person to whom it is addressed.").
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A conviction for mail fraud requires proof that the defendant acted with
knowledge that the use of the mail would follow in the ordinary course of
business or that a reasonable person would have foreseen use of the mail.1"9
The mailing itself does not have to be false or fraudulent. 130 Even a routine
or innocent mailing may supply the mailing element as long as it contrib-
utes to the execution of the scheme.' 31 For instance, in Carpenterv. United
States the foreseeable circulation of the Wall Street Journal was an essential
part of the scheme to defraud the newspaper of its confidential business
information. 3 ' Had the newspaper column not been made available to
Journal customers through the mail, there would have been no effect on
stock prices and no likelihood of profiting from the information that the
defendant leaked to a broker.'33 The government does not have to estab-
lish that the defendant used the mails himself (as in Carpenter) or that he
even intended use of the mails. Rather "the government need only prove
that the scheme depended for its success in some way upon the informa-
tion and documents which passed through the mail.' 34 In fact, the use of
the mails need not be an essential element of the scheme, but rather only
incident to an essential part of the scheme.'35 While the mailing needs to
be some step in the defendant's plot, a distant connection between the
mailing and the scheme to defraud can suffice, as was the case in Schmuck
v. United States.136
Schmuck, a used car salesman, rolled back vehicle odometers, sold the
vehicles to retail dealers, and then these dealers sold the cars to unwitting
customers. 137 The government argued that the retail dealers' submission of
title applications in order to complete the final sale supplied the mailing
element of the fraud.'38 The success of Schmuck's fraud allegedly "de-
pended upon his continued harmonious relations with, and good reputa-
tion among, retail dealers, which in turn required the smooth flow of cars
[and their titles] from the dealers to their customers."' 139 According to the
Supreme Court, Schmuck's scheme did not reach fruition until the retail
129 Frost, 125 E3d at354.
130 See United States v. Morrow, 39 E3d 1228, 1237 (ist Cir. 1994) (finding the defendant
guilty of mail fraud even though the mailing itself was not deceptive).
131 Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1989).
132 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987) (holding that the circulation of the
Wall Street Journal column was not only anticipated but also an essential part of the scheme).
133 Id.; see also United States v. Draiman, 784 F.2d 248, 251 (7th Cir. 1986) (reasoning
as long as the defendant knew that mailings were to be used in furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme, it does not matter that the mailings were done in the ordinary course of business).
134 United States v. Akpan, 407 F3d 360, 37o(5th Cir. 2005).
135 Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 710-11.
136 Id. at 705.
137 Id. at 707.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 71 1-12.
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dealers resold the cars and effected transfers of title, so the Court found
that the mailing was in furtherance of the scheme. 140
The Court refocused the mailing requirement by looking at the subjec-
tive intent of the defendant. The test under Schmuck is "whether the mail-
ing is part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator
at the time, regardless of whether the mailing later, through hindsight, may
prove to have been counterproductive and return to haunt the perpetrator
of the fraud" (as it did in Schmuck's case). 14 1 "Those who use the mails
to defraud proceed at their [own] peril."'141 It was of no consequence that
the odometer tampering was the root of the fraud that bore no relation to
the mailing of the titles by the retail dealers.'43 Justice Scalia, dissenting,
criticized the breadth of the test laid out by the majority, arguing that "it
is mail fraud, not mail and fraud, that incurs liability. This federal statute
is not violated by a fraudulent scheme in which, at some point, a mailing
happens to occur."'" The Court's analysis in Schmuck effectively reduces
the mailing element to a mere jurisdictional requirement.
It is fairly easy to satisfy the mailing element in most cases.'45 Like
intent, proof of mailing can be established entirely by circumstantial evi-
dence.46 Testimonial evidence as to customary office practice can be suffi-
cient proof of mailing.'47 Also, in 1994, Congress enlarged the jurisdictional
scope of the mail fraud statute by extending its reach to any parcel that is
"sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier.""' This
amendment expanded the statute beyond the traditional view of a provi-
sion designed to protect the postal service and allows prosecutions of mail
fraud absent a United States Post Office mailing.4 9
Although this element seems to have little limits left, one limit remains
intact in a few circuits. Mailings made or caused to be made under the im-
perative command of duty imposed by state law cannot be criminal under
the federal mail fraud statute. 50 The Fifth Circuit has held that legally
140 Id. at 71z.
141 Id. at 715.
142 Id. at715.
143 Henning, supra note 7, at 458.
144 Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145 United States v. Hickok, 77 F3 d 992, 1003-04 (7th Cir. 1996).
146 United States v. Massey, 827 F.2d 995, 999 (5th Cir. 1987); see also United States v.
Waymer, 55 E3d 564, 571 (i ith Cir. 1995) ("Proof of a routine practice of using the mail to
accomplish a business end is sufficient to support a jury's determination that mailing occurred
in a particular instance.").
147 United States v. Bowman, 783 F.2d 1192, 1197 (5th Cir. 1986).
148 I8 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
149 See Henning, supra note 7, at 438 (explaining the expansive nature of the mail fraud
statute); see also Podgor, supra note 19, at 751-52 (explaining how the mail fraud statute has
become a generic fraud statute without concern for the mailing element).
15o Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 391 (i96o).
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required mailings can be prosecuted as mail fraud only if they contain false
statements.' 51 This "legal duty" exception was reaffirmed by the Third
Circuit in United States v. Cross.'5 The mailings in Cross consisted of notices
of dismissals, notices of conviction, and notices of favorable disposition.
5 3
The court agreed that the mailings were foreseeable by the defendants, but
because mailing of those notices were required by law as an integral and
necessary part of the court's adjudication of cases, the mailings could not be
deemed to have been made "for the purpose of executing" the fraudulent
scheme. 154
The Fifth Circuit also reiterated that the government must prove the
mailings relate in some way to the fraud. The court declined to endorse a
broad reading of section 1341's mailing requirement and view an innocent
mailing as satisfying the element of mail fraud when the government had
failed to offer any explanation as to how the mailing furthered the scheme
to defraud.' Most often, however, courts ignore that many of the mailings
are peripheral to the fraudulent scheme.
III. SENTENCING
While use of the post office no longer has a predominant role in the convic-
tion of mail fraud, mailing still remains the focus in determining the de-
fendant's sentence since the use of the mails is the offense the statute de-
nounces.'56 Thus, each mailing constitutes a separate offense, or count, of
mail fraud even if the mailings are part of a single scheme.'57 A defendant
convicted under section 1341 will be fined and/or imprisoned not more
than twenty years, and if the violation affects a financial institution, the de-
fendant will be fined not more than $1,000,000 and/or imprisoned not more
than thirty years."' An amendment to the mail fraud statute is currently
pending to increase penalties for those engaging in mail fraud during and
in relation to a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency. 9 A
151 United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 412 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Mailings of documents
which are required by law to be mailed, and which are not themselves false and fraudulent,
cannot be regarded as mailed for the purpose of executing a fraudulent scheme.").
152 United States v. Cross, 128 E3 d 145, 152 (3d Cir. I997) ("The scope of the federal
mail fraud statute is limited .... [Llegally required mailings in circumstances like those in
this case cannot be deemed to have been made 'for the purpose of executing' a fraudulent
scheme.").
153 Id. at 149-50.
154 Id. at 15o, 152.
155 United States v. Tencer, 107 F3d 1120, 1126 (5th Cir. 1997).
156 Cochran v. United States, 41 E2d 193, 197 (8th Cir. 1930).
157 United States v. Gardner, 65 E3 d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1995) ("It is not the plan or scheme
that is punished, but rather each individual use of the mails in furtherance of that scheme.").
158 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
159 Emergency and Disaster Assistance Fraud Penalty Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R.
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conviction of fraud under the amended section will carry the same penalty
associated with violations that affect financial institutions. 160
A prosecutor may try to structure an indictment and charge multiple
counts of mail fraud, and therefore try to increase the length of a defen-
dant's sentence, but even if the defendant is convicted on each count, the
Sentencing Guidelines provide relief by combining offenses that are close-
ly related. 16 1 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G") section
3D1.2161 states that all counts involving substantially the same harm shall
be grouped together into a single group. 163 If the counts involve the same
victim and the same act or transaction, grouping is appropriate." The com-
mentary to the guidelines lists specific examples for grouping mail fraud.
If the defendant is convicted of two counts of mail fraud and one count of
wire fraud, each in furtherance of a single fraudulent scheme, the counts
are to be grouped together, even if the mailings and telephone call oc-
846, 1 ioth Cong. § 4 (2oo7) ("Section 1341 of title I8, United States Code, is amended by
inserting: 'occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted,
transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or
emergency, or' after 'If the violation."').
I6o Id. ("Section 1341 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting: 'occurs
in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred,
disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency,
or' after 'If the violation."').
161 See United States v. Mullens, 65 E 3 d I56o, 15 64 ( iIth Cit. 199S) ("The main purpose
of U.S.S.G. § 3D 1.2 is 'to combine offenses involving closely related counts."').
162 UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3 D1.2 (2005)
§ 3D1.2. GROUPS OF CLOSELY RELATED COUNTS
All counts involving substantially the same harm shall
be grouped together into a single Group. Counts involve
substantially the same harm within the meaning of this rule:
(a) When counts involve the same victim and the same act or transaction.
(b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or
transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting
part of a common scheme or plan.
(c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that
is treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or other
adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the counts.
(d) When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total
amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some
other measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing
or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written to cover
such behavior.
Offenses covered by the following guidelines are to be grouped
under this subsection.
Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. § 3DI.2(a).
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curred on different days.165 Additionally, if the defendant is convicted of
five counts of mail fraud and ten counts of wire fraud, even though the
counts arise from various schemes, and each involves a monetary objective,
all fifteen counts are to be grouped together.'66
Grouping counts serves as a major limit once a defendant is convicted
of mail fraud by drastically cutting the amount of time he could potentially
be sentenced. Even though the grouping of counts alleviates the length
of a sentence, it remains to be seen if this limit will continue to apply.
Recently, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory application of the
Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutional.'67 Although the courts no lon-
ger must adhere to the Sentencing Guidelines, it is yet to be determined
how far federal judges can deviate from the Guidelines. 168 Most likely this
limit is still intact.
IV. TIME FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO STEP IN
Although the lower courts have been trying to rein in the strength of pros-
ecutors, there is little conformity in the limits, and many circuits continue
to interpret the statute broadly.
The primary purpose of the statute, the protection of the post office,
no longer serves to curb the strength of the statute. While the focus of the
statute should remain on the misuse of the United States Postal Service
and leave all other cases to be dealt with by the appropriate state law, it
seems the mailing element has become a mere jurisdictional hook.'69 The
Court's stretch in Schmuck indicates how easily the Court is willing to find
the requisite mailing. By creating a single test focusing on the subjective
intent of the defendant, the Court has "effectively eliminated the limita-
tions on the mailing" element. 70 Further, this case seems to be the Court's
final verdict on this element. In addition, Congress's inclusion of private
interstate commercial carriers further increases the power of the statute.
The "legal duty" exception fails to help most persons charged with mail
fraud since many circuits recognize legally necessary mailings as meeting
the element of using the mail.' 7'
165 Id. § 3D1.2, cmt. 4.
I66 Id. § 3Di.2, cmt. 6.
I67 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
168 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide whether a criminal sentence
that is below the guideline range is reasonable, see Claiborne v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 551
(2oo6) (mem.), and whether a sentence that is within the range is to be treated as reasonable
and thus valid, see Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 551 (2oo6) (mem.). Oral arguments for both
cases were heard on February 20, 2007.
169 See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 722-23 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(referring to the mailing requirement as a "jurisdictional hook").
170 Moohr, supra note 22.
171 See United States v. Frost, 125 F3d 346, 354 (1997) ("mailings may be innocent or
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The Supreme Court has recently stepped in to define the reach of
"scheme to defraud." In Neder, the Supreme Court went back to com-
mon-law fraud and held that materiality is required under mail fraud, even
though over 100 years earlier the Supreme Court had declined to follow
common-law fraud in Durland."7 ' The Court restricted an ever expanding
definition of property in Cleveland by deciding government permits and
licenses do not qualify as property.173 Both of these cases illustrate the
Supreme Court's "continuing dissatisfaction with the Government's seem-
ingly boundless view of the [mail fraud] statute and provide considerable
ammunition for defense attorneys."' 74
The Supreme Court needs to speak once again on the issue of the hon-
est services doctrine. Lower courts have taken the initiative by limiting
the scheme to defraud element by curtailing the reach of the doctrine. Re-
straining the statute in the area of honest services may serve the greatest
good since there are no clear definitions in this area of the law. The control
of corruption is achieved through vague, undefined legislation that gives
enormous discretion to prosecutors. 75
Congress has failed to define the limits of sections 1341 and 1346.
Neither statute gives proper notice of what constitutes a violation. When
the Supreme Court attempted to eliminate the honest services doctrine,
Congress immediately reacted with new legislation. Rather than eliminat-
ing the honest services doctrine, the Supreme Court needs to define the
parameters of the doctrine, just as it has provided guidance in Neder and
Cleveland. Within the private sector honest services cases, the Court should
adopt the approach of many circuits requiring a finding of a fiduciary duty
owed by the defendant. For cases involving public officials, there should
be a requirement of a violation of either a state or federal law. These restric-
tions would give notice as to what violates the statute and would prevent
the federal government from creating its own definition of what constitutes
good behavior. The lower courts have laid the groundwork for limiting the
statute and the Supreme Court must again speak on the issue.
even legally necessary").
172 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999).
173 Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15 (2000).
174 Mogin, supra note 2, at 13.
175 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine.- Someone to
Watch Over Us, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 153, I56 (1994) (questioning whether vague, undefined
federal legislation giving enormous discretion to prosecutors is the appropriate way to control
political corruption).
2oo6-2oo7]

